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FORUM
- Opinion in the CNJ
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How many reasons were there for war?
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Philosopher Ted Honderich argues there are at least seven
complex and intertwined reasons for the fighting in Iraq
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US troops in action in Fallujah

Ted Honderich
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IT is a mark of New Labours concentration on its careerism
to the exclusion of actual thinking about things, that at bottom
it gave one compelling reason for attacking Iraq, the need of
pre-emptive self-defence, saving us from what could happen in
45 minutes.
Has there ever been any war in history that had only one true
explanation or cause?
The question is like the question of whether a match has ever
lit only because it was struck.
We know the answer is no, because damp matches and matches out
of oxygen do not light. We know too that in general human motivation
is mixed.
The governments simplicity in its explanation of why it
was going to war was a bad model.
It led too many other people to say the cause was just oil or
whatever. But all of us, when we are thinking and are not ordinary
politicians, know things are not simple.
One large motivation on the part of Mr Blair and Mr Brown, who
were in it together, was alliance with America.
This is not only to say alliance with the people to which we are
related by language, history and some culture. The alliance was
with the remaining super power and, still more importantly, it
was ideological.
It was with the most complete example of an economic, political
and social system.
That is, the system of demands for external rather than internal
incentives and property freedom, and hierarchic democracy instead
of democracy and cheap equalities.
A second motivation was to make a further and general preventive
response, beyond the attack on Afghanistan, to the possibility
of more attacks prefigured by 9/11.
This response did not in fact require the truth of what was pretended,
if not so absurdly as in America, which was a collaborative connection
of Iraq to 9/11.
A third explanation was the advancing of the principal cause of
neo-conservatives in and around the United States government.
This was neo-Zionism, the violation of Palestine beyond the 1967
borders of Israel.
A fourth element in the war was a perception of the self-interests
of Britain and America, things separable from just a strategic
alliance, advancing an ideology, and deterring the terrorism on
the other side.
This self-interest, certainly on the part of the United States,
had much to do with the essential commodity of oil. Fifth, there
were personal motivations, the careerism of a Prime Minister of
passion within the limited horizons and education of only a lawyer,
his careerism being a fitting counterpart to the determination
of an ignorant president who was the son of a president who had
left unfinished business behind him.
Perhaps, sixthly, there was what was called a motive of humanitarian
intervention in the war and the rescuing of some part of a people
from a dictatorship with a record of savagery. The weight or size
assigned to this cause must be the result of considering other
cases of international inaction and omission.
Seventh, there was the entwining of corporations with the American
government, the policy of defending and opening up business possibilities
by means of war.
Such an account of the causation and motivation with respect to
the war on Iraq may not be much disputed, except in politics.
In better intellectual company, only the hard and indeed philosophical
question of the weighting of the elements of explanation is in
dispute. What are the consequences of such an account for the
question of the nature of New Labour? What follows from the fact
that the 45-minute lie or culpable self-deception was put in its
place as the explanation?
You are not required, as a Prime Minister, always to tell the
truth. You can indeed lie to save your country. You can lie to
protect the life of a spy. However, you cannot lie to suck up
to an hegemony stupid in its ignorance. Nor can you lie to forward
an ideology, a matter of passion in ideas.You cannot lie to try
to have a place in history. Those are situations in which you
cannot lie. They can come together in one.
There are related facts. One is that democracy has no need of
a ferret at the despatch box. Another is that you can conduct
yourself in a matter of the utmost seriousness, where lives will
certainly be lost and children maimed, by the rules of a courtroom
that has no judge. You can, that is, be a democratic politician
who acts as an advocate unscrupulous or worse, counting on not
being held to account by a judge, and ready with the pitiable
excuse that eventually the people will judge. It does not matter
to this excuse if the lives will be lost beforehand.
If the governance of a society is not to be placed in the hands
of those who remain businessmen, it is not to be placed either
in the hands of those who remain in the habits of shysters.
Ted Honderich is Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy
of Mind and Logic at University College London. This argument
is taken from his latest book Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush,
Blair? (Pluto Press, £17.99).
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